Executive summary
This paper argues that serious fiscal vulnerabilities arising from many years of high government debt will create new and complex interactions between public debt management (PDM) and monetary policy (MP).
The paper notes that, although their formal mandates have not changed, recent balance sheet policies of many Central Banks (CBs) have tended to blur the separation of their policies from fiscal policy (FP). The mandates of debt management offices (DMOs) have usually had a microeconomic focus (viz, keeping government debt markets liquid, limiting refunding risks etc). Such mandates have usually eschewed any macroeconomic policy dimension.
1 For these reasons, all clashes in policy mandate between CBs and DMOs have been latent and not overt.
The paper argues that under 'normal' circumstances, these distinct mandates have worked well. CBs and DMOs, as independent institutions with different objectives, responsibilities and functions, have usually enjoyed clear working relationships that functioned (often in the same markets) without policy conflicts. Both CBs and DMOs could serve the general interest best by executing their separate, specific mandates.
It will be argued, however, that the financial and economic crisis has led to some blurring of lines between public debt management (PDM) and monetary policy (MP). DMOs have operated more extensively at the short end of yield curve, and CBs have been increasingly active in the same long government bond markets as DMOs. It will also be argued that during crisis periods, the different mandates appeared sometimes to be in conflict.
There is no consensus about the macroeconomics of government debt management. But the economics profession need to re-focus on this subject and in 1 The formal mandates of some DMOs include a reference to macroeconomic policy in their debt management objective. For example, the objective of UK's DMO requires consistency with the aims of monetary policy. Other debt managers do not include macroeconomic objectives. The US Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee has argued that debt maturity decisions should be taken "regardless of monetary policy": see Section 9 below.
Introduction
This paper provides an overview of the growing debate on new and complex interactions between public debt management (PDM), monetary policy (MP) and financial instability in conditions of serious fiscal vulnerabilities, higher sovereign risk and considerable uncertainty about future interest rates [denoted as fiscal dominance in Turner (2011)]. These conditions are likely to last for a long time. Although both these interactions and fiscal dominance were accentuated by the global financial crisis and its aftermath, structural changes in (or features of) the new financial (and business) landscape may be among the deeper reasons why some of these new complex links are likely to persist.
Unfortunately, our inquiry is hampered by a lack of consensus about the macroeconomics of government debt management, reflected in a very considerable diversity of views on this subject. But the economics profession need to re-focus on this subject and in particular go beyond theoretical frameworks based on debt management neutrality. Until this issue has been more satisfactorily dealt with in the literature and, more generally, better understood by both policymakers and academics, considerable caution needs to be exercised about the policy implications of conditions under which the conventional, microeconomic-focused PDM approach may conflict with wider, macroeconomic considerations. Against this backdrop, the paper raises -in a very tentative waythree issues:
 Whether a broader mandate for PDM is desirable;  How such a broader mandate might affect potential conflicts with CBs that are using their balance sheets on a large scale;  Whether new functional arrangements between debt managers (DMs), central banks (CBs) and fiscal authorities (FAs) need to be contemplated, either temporarily or permanently. This involves a review whether this new complex situation 2 requires a change in the micro portfolio mandate for debt management and whether new functional arrangements between debt managers (DMs), central bankers (CBs) but also fiscal authorities (FAs) need to be seriously contemplated.
To that end, three (related) principal policy questions will be examined in this paper:
(1) Is the current, traditional separation between mandates for PDM 3 and MP 4 sufficiently robust to deal effectively with financial stability challenges (including banking crises), deep recessions and risks of fiscal dominance?
(2) More specifically, are current institutional arrangements for PDM robust enough to deal effectively with major shifts in policies and/or policy outcomes (possibly leading to conflicts or co-ordination problems) like (a) unconventional monetary policies (QE; prolonged ultralow rates), (b) large or rapidly increasing budget deficits, and (c) a strong increase in borrowing needs, public debt and sovereign risk?
(3) Or should the micro portfolio-based debt management strategy, which aims at maintaining orderly conditions in government debt markets and minimising refunding risks, be supplemented by macroeconomic perspectives on fiscal policy, monetary control and financial stability. For example, should DMs take explicit account of monetary policy and/or financial stability objectives when designing and implementing debt management strategies? What would be the practical consequences of a macro-based mandate for the (direct) debt management objective of ensuring smooth access to markets, while minimising borrowing cost (subject to an acceptable or desirable level of market risk)? For example, is it 2 How far this new situation reflects a non-normal policy environment is part of the debate.
3
Securing smooth access to funding and medium-term borrowing at minimum costs subject to a preferred level of risk. 4 Delivering price stability, maintaining liquidity in domestic money markets, securing the efficient and stable operations of payment transfer systems, etc.
necessary that the minimisation of borrowing costs should be subordinate to financial stability considerations during times of extreme market stress? If this is so, would it perhaps be necessary or useful to change the institutional set-up and mandate for DMOs? Are there (other) macroeconomic considerations that affect the maturity structure or other dimensions of government debt (e.g. types of instruments such as inflation-linked versus nominal paper) and that would require some rethinking about the micro-portfolio mandate of DMOs?
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. A historical perspective on today's policy debate is given in section 2. The separation between public debt management and monetary policy is assessed in section 3. Section 4 discusses fiscal dominance and the long-term interest rate. Imperfect asset substitutability across maturities is analysed in section 5. The relationship between the long-term interest rate and financial stability is investigated in section 6. A macroeconomic view of central bank operations in government debt markets is given in section 7 and of sovereign debt management in section 8. Section 9 studies the potential for policy conflicts between public debt management and monetary policy. The need for a broader (macro) mandate for public debt management is discussed in section 10. The final section concludes.
An historical perspective on mandates and policy co-ordination
There is ample evidence that the arrangements for PDM and MP in place before the 2. to minimise (over the medium-term) government borrowing costs subject to a clearly articulated, preferred level of risk; and 3. to develop liquid government bond markets.
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Referred to as the micro portfolio approach in Blommestein and Hubig (2011) .
The financial crisis has led to some radical rethinking about central banking: whilst the pre-eminence of price stability has remained, financial stability objectives (notably those with a systemic dimension) have gained ground. 6 Actual central bank operations in many segments of financial markets beyond short-term money markets have become more prominent. As Goodhart (2010) , argues, central banks have in some sense returned to their very roots.
This re-thinking of the role of the central bank makes necessary a similar re-thinking about government debt management. The recent crisis has brought to the surface the fact that the macro-economic dimension of government debt management has not had the attention it deserves. This is a difficult and contentious subject. Careful analysis and debate is therefore needed before changing policy frameworks that have worked well. Imprudent changes -or even smaller wrong-headed modifications -would be very risky. It is the quality of the debate among relevant policymakers and the weight of the evidence that should in the end determine whether or not changes in existing arrangements should be contemplated. After all, it is the long-term track record and high quality of the current institutional set-up that created policy credibility in financial markets over many years.
Hard-won policy credibility, in turn, is an important determinant of economic development. More specifically, the quality of public debt management and a strong, credible (independent) central bank are both most important for economic development.
Take the following example from economic history as an illustration. Why did Britain surpass France, a country which had significantly larger economic resources in the 18th century? In his famous book The Cash Nexus (Ferguson, 2001) (a) the adequacy of the micro portfolio approach to PDM; (b) the robustness of the separation between MP (CB) and PDM (DMO) and (c) the possible need for different (including more intense) co-ordination arrangements.
Almost 15 years ago, the OECD and IMF undertook a comprehensive study on separation and co-ordination arrangements between PDM and MP as part of the design of technical assistance programmes to formerly centrally planned economies (the so-called countries in transition). To that end, a survey was undertaken for the 1995-1996 OECD/IMF Project on the Co-ordination of Monetary Policy and Public Debt Management, covering 14 countries from both the OECD area and emerging markets.
The resulting report [see Sundararajan, Dattels and Blommestein (1997)] noted that during the mid-1990s, Ministries of Finance (MoF) were in general responsible for most executive debt management functions, carried out by specialised units within the ministry (in many cases they were part of a Treasury directorate; which also had other tasks in financial management). The central bank (CB) was often the agent for highly technical activities such as the selling of securities by auction and the settlement of trades. In some countries, however, the CB had in these years a much bigger role, and was initially charged Another conflict of interest is that advanced knowledge of its interest rate decisions could induce a central bank to bring forward bond issuance ahead of raising interest rates.
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By the early 1990s, many OECD countries had created committees for consultation and co-ordination between MoF and CBs on public debt policy. Such committees (where ministries of planning and legal experts from the ministry of justice could also be represented) proved very effective as platforms for sharing information and for the joint monitoring of the country's overall debt situation (including private external debt). These committees proved also useful in detailing the role of each agency in the execution of the debt programme, resulting in agency agreements about the relationships between MoF, DMO and CBs as well as a detailed specification of the various functions of debt management performed by each agency.
In the 1990s, then, the operational responsibility of managing government debt was given in more OECD countries to operationally autonomous DMOs. 13 These were given clear objectives (such as the minimisation of expected costs subject to pre-defined risk tolerance limits). There was the widespread adoption of portfolio benchmarks. This realignment of policy frameworks often went together with the independence of central banks with clear inflation mandates.
14 There is no doubt that these market-based reforms helped to make government debt markets work better, and lower long-term borrowing costs for governments. The global financial crisis and its aftermath, however, has created some awkward co-ordination problems for this separation of policy mandates.
3.
How robust is the separation between sovereign debt management and monetary policy?
Tobin's equivalence
The obvious logical difficulty in separating monetary policy and public debt management is well known. It is that both policies involve the sale of official debt -albeit in different forms -to the private sector. Firms and households react as the composition of their portfolios is altered -and such responses have macroeconomic effects.
Central banks in effect issue the shortest duration official debt in their operations to implement monetary policy. From the perspective of portfolio choice, government issuance of short-term debt is like monetary expansion. Tobin (1963) The shorter the maturity of Treasury bills, the closer it is to "money". While monetary policy is separated from public debt management and fiscal policy, it is recognised that the monetary transmission mechanism may be affected through the impact of the structure of debt on market expectations. Circumstances that entail a risk of "fiscal dominance" (that is, high public debt ratios and heightened sovereign risk weakening the local banking system) can increase uncertainty about future interest rates. This may create expectations of time-inconsistent monetary policies (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Sargent, 1993) .
Our focus, although related to this insight, will be more specific. It will be on how particular circumstances of macroeconomic or financial system weaknesses could reduce asset substitutability in financial markets. As asset substitutability across the maturity spectrum declines, conventional central bank interest rate policy tools (such as the overnight rate) become less effective and direct central bank transactions in bond markets become more effective. The boundary between debt management and monetary policy therefore becomes more and more blurred. This creates a greater need for policy coordination and this may, practically speaking, require a broader interpretation of existing MP or PDM mandates. In other words, the neat-and-tidy separation of policy mandates may not always make for good practical policy. 17 This note considers this issue in a world of fiscal dominance.
The arguments summarised here are spelt out more fully in Turner (2011) , which contains a number of qualifications to the arguments that follow.
Fiscal dominance and the long-term interest rate

New fiscal dominance?
In the OECD area, general government debt increased from 69.8% in 2000 to 73.1%
of GDP in 2007 and to an estimated 97.6% of GDP at the end of 2010 (while outstanding sovereign debt is projected to further increase to 105.4% of GDP at the end of 2012).
Sovereign debt managers are therefore facing major challenges in managing a massive increase in the global stock of government debt, including huge uncertainty about the size of future budget deficits and their financing. There has been an increase in sovereign risk.
The huge rise in sovereign debt by itself is going to have lasting effects on the size and the composition of private sector balance sheets. In addition, there is considerable debate (among academics and policymakers) about the short-term versus long-term impact of fiscal reform measures. As a result, there are major differences of view on how quickly deficits (and sovereign debts) should be reduced to achieve fiscal sustainability. Some would stress deflation risks and others inflation risks. What choices will governments make and how will these influence future rates of inflation? In any event, it is fairly certain that government debt/GDP ratios in major countries will continue to rise, setting the stage for a new period of fiscal dominance.
(i) Perspectives from economic theory and empirical work but no consensus
There is no (academic) consensus about the impact of large government debt on the long-term interest rate. A key question is: how strong are Ricardian effects? Academic studies yield a wide range of estimates. In a world of full Ricardian Equivalence, households increase their savings by the present value of future taxes needed to repay government debt. Their desired bond holdings rise by the exact increase in government debt issuance.
The long-term interest rate therefore remains constant.
Another question is whether fiscal dominance or monetary dominance will prevail. In short, there is great uncertainty about impact of high government debt on future inflation rates and on real interest rates … and thus on the long-term interest rate.
(ii) Destabilising market dynamics?
What precisely this will mean for the future interest rate volatility depends in part on market dynamics. Banks have taken leveraged positions in government bonds. The larger interest rate exposures become, and the more dependent they are on leverage, the greater the probability of destabilising dynamics. When expectations about yields change, households with variable rate mortgages, banks and other leveraged investors may all tend to "herd" in their efforts to cut interest rate exposures. Even a temporary bout of financial market volatility can undermine the value of an asset as collateral. 20 This dimension of "collateral capacity" can be crucial for the prices of bonds of crisis-hit countries during periods of market stress.
Imperfect asset substitutability across maturities
Uncertainty about future interest rates is important because it determines whether investors regard short-term and long-term paper as close substitutes. In a world of perfect certainty about future short-term rates, debt of different terms would be perfect substitutes for one another. When short-dated and long-dated paper are close substitutes, control of the overnight interest rate is sufficient for central banks to affect the near end of the yield curve.
longer-run inflation is a fiscal phenomenon. Woodford (2000) Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) demonstrate just how important is the impact of collateral practices on demand for non-core financial assets. The "collateral capacity" of an asset depends on its volatility. If this increases (or is expected to increase), the value of an asset as collateral falls much more than its market price because lenders demand larger haircuts of more volatile assets. Leveraged investors will therefore become more inclined to buy assets which they can pledge as collateral with minimum "haircuts" (ie the discount applied to the asset's current market value) to their bankers -and may have to forego buying some assets regarded as underpriced (because their price has become too volatile).
But uncertainty about the path of future interest rates will make debt of different maturities imperfect substitutes. Because of this, changes in the mix of short-term and long-term bonds offered by the government will change relative prices, and so influence the shape of the yield curve. At the same time, monetary policy based on setting the policy rate becomes less effective as transmission to other interest rates is reduced. Hence central bank purchases or sales of bonds become more effective exactly when classic monetary policyreliant on the overnight rate -works less well.
This perspective is much broader than the special case of the Zero Lower Boundwhen the overnight rate cannot be reduced. Even when the policy rate is above zero, imperfect asset substitutability along the yield curve means that monetary policy can be made to work more surely and more rapidly by central bank action in longer-dated markets. This predictability itself probably made banks and others increase their leverage -including in interest rate markets -and so kept long-term rates low.
Analysis of this is very difficult. There is no reason to expect the degree of substitutability between assets of different maturities to be constant over time. In addition to the uncertainty about future interest rates created by large government debt, the ability of financial intermediaries to take maturity exposures will also be an important determinant.
Collateral requirements on leveraged investors in financial assets will also affect the relative attractions of different assets. All these determinants are likely to change over the cycle. In a crisis, therefore, asset substitutability will fall. This is not only because uncertainty about future interest rates rises. It is also because banks will impose more demanding collateral requirements and will be less able to undertake interest rate arbitrage operations. Such uncertainty and the impaired intermediation capacity of banks were important justifications for the exceptional balance sheet policies that central banks in the major countries followed in the recent crisis.
Central banks in EMEs, where financial markets are typically thinner, may need to be more interventionist. The domestic investor base is often quite small and often dominated by a few large, local banks. This means that local bonds are less reliable as collateral at times of market stress (Fostel and Geanakopolos, 2008) . The central bank could not just reduce the policy rate but had to take direct action to lower the long-term rate in government debt markets.
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Policymakers will not find it easy in real time to identify large but temporary shocks that distort investors' portfolio choices. Nor will they be able to quantify the impact on underlying asset substitutability. What often becomes clear in retrospect (eg incipient rises 21 In addition, other unorthodox policy measures were also adopted. Several EMEs (eg Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) eased mark-to-market rules on banks and other financial institutions holding bonds -especially after the IASB and the accounting rulemakers in the United States had relaxed mark-to-market rules for illiquid assets. The justification is that relaxing such rules can forestall distress selling which could destabilise the whole system. in bond market volatility related to worries about fiscal deficits, difficulties in finding adequate collateral, leveraged positions in interest rate markets holding down long-term yields etc) will not be so obvious and measurable at the time. The pressure on central banks to act in bond markets will often be framed in terms of countering market volatility.
22 But at what point this could be tantamount to impeding discovery of the underlying market prices will sometimes be hard to judge.
The long-term interest rate and financial stability
Policy choices are made yet more difficult by another complication: the importance of the long-term rate for financial stability. It could be dangerous to manipulate the longterm interest rate just for macroeconomic objectives. The potential side-effects on financial stability could be significant. It is the structure of interest rates that creates incentives for the maturity exposures that households and the financial industry choose to take. the incentives for maturity exposures created by the structure of interest rates. An additional complication is that in some jurisdictions the increased perception of sovereign risk has raised questions about how far domestic government bonds can be considered as 'risk-free assets'. This is becoming a major challenge for the borrowing strategies of some sovereign debt managers.
Macroeconomics of central bank operations in government debt markets
But the main emphasis of Keynes was on the macroeconomic theory. Keynes went on to suggest that the "most important practical improvement which can be made in technique of monetary management" would be to replace "the single Bank rate for short-term bills" by "a complex offer by the central bank to buy and sell at stated prices gilt-edged bonds of all maturities".
It was Tobin in the 1960s who developed the theoretical models of how central bank operations in long-term debt markets work. This focus was on portfolio rebalancing channels.

One channel is rebalancing between domestic assets. Central bank purchase of bonds force lower bond holdings on the private sector. The effect on the yield curve is greater the lower the degree of substitutability between long-dated and short-dated paper.
Another is the international portfolio rebalancing channel. Central bank purchases to lower long-term yields should shift portfolio demands from domestic to foreign assets. This should induce currency depreciation, which would reinforce the impact on aggregate demand coming from the domestic rebalancing channel. 26 The BIS was founded in 1930.
Nobody disputes the logic of these portfolio rebalancing effects. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which such policies can be highly effective. In times of crisis, for instance, a large (but temporary) decline in domestic asset substitutability (because of greater macroeconomic uncertainty, banks with weakened balance sheets less able to take interest rate risks etc) will make activist debt management policies by central banks more effective. When bonds are widely held by foreigners, exchange rate effects may be strong.
History of central bank operations in government debt markets
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Keynes was writing in the 1930s. As today, government debt ratios were high - In the closing months of World War II, with the UK facing huge government debts, Note that he mentioned the interest burden to the government last of all -quite the opposite of the current policy focus of DMOs. In any event, the upshot of the NDE was that the policy of "cheap money", which began in the 1930s depression, was reinforced in the post-war period.
It was the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury who drafted the memo, dated 15
May 1945, that summarised the Enquiry's conclusions. He made a point of noting that it took as given Keynes's view that the long-term rate of interest could be controlled by determined official action. The proposed "programme of initial procedure" as he put it -the idea was to adapt this policy in the light of experience -was: "the Treasury bill rate to be brought down to ½% and 5-year bonds to be issued at 1½% and 10-year bonds at 2% to be issued on tap, a new series to be started annually". So Keynes won in 1945 the argument he had lost in the 1930s.
During the 1950s, the proportion of long-dated debt fell steadily. The policy objective became one of holding long-term interest rates down even as growth and investment strengthened. Shorter-term issuance increased. This prompted the Radcliffe Report to describe the huge supply of short-dated bonds as "a constant source of embarrassment to the authorities". The Report explicitly countered the Treasury view on the need to support by bond market. They argued that greater efforts "to foster greater understanding outside official circles … of the intentions of the authorities would reduce the risk of perverse reactions in the market *from bond sales+".
There have been similar debates in the United States. There was apparently a form of Quantitative Easing in the 1930s, 28 followed by similar efforts to keep long-term rates low during wartime. The United States relied to an increasing extent on shorter-term debt for much of the 1950s and 1960s. A legal ceiling of 4¼% on the rate the Treasury could offer on long-term bonds constrained issuance. As inflation rose, maturities shortened. By January 1976, the average maturity of US government debt reached a low point of only 26 months.
But once the 4¼% ceiling had been relaxed, the US Treasury did begin a policy of gradually increasing the average maturity of debt. But by 1980, the average maturity of US 28 Anderson (2010) .
government debt was still less than four years (compared with more than 12 years in the United Kingdom
29
).
Graph 1 charts the average maturity of US government debt during the past 30 years -in terms of both the outstanding stock (green line) and issuance (red line). It is striking how large the swings in the average maturity of debt have been. This prompts an obvious question: how have these swings been related to macroeconomic policies? To answer this question, a naïve regression was conducted to see how the average maturity of bonds outstanding (AVMAT) was related to the Federal funds rate (R) and the Federal deficit/GDP ratio (DEF%GDP). The regression was run on annual data over the period 1982 to 2010; it was corrected for first order serial correlation. The
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Maturity of US government bonds
Federal deficit as a percentage of GDP, which is not known immediately, is lagged one year.
Dividing this period into two halves yielded significantly different intercept terms (while the coefficients on the independent variables were not different). This suggests that, irrespective of movements in the independent variables, the average maturity of bonds outstanding tended to fall more rapidly during the first period. To allow for this, a dummy In short, there has in the past been quite a strong empirical link between actual debt management choices and two simple measures of both fiscal policy and monetary policy. It provides prima facie evidence that debt management choices in the US at least have been endogenous with respect to macroeconomic policy. Hoogduin et al (2010 Hoogduin et al ( ,2011 also found that, in the euro area, a steepening in the yield curve leads national debt managers to shorten the duration of their issuance. The key point is that debt management choices do not seem in practice to have been independent of monetary policy.
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Government debt management in a macroeconomic spotlight
Such prima facie endogeneity means we need to look more closely at the mandate of the government debt manager. In theory, the mandate could be defined in several ways.
At one extreme, the Treasury could, once a year, give its debt manager a maturity objective that is consistent with the government's current macroeconomic objectives. At the other extreme, the mandate could be defined in a way that makes it exogenous to macroeconomic policy. The debt manager could be told (e.g. by the fiscal authority after approval by parliament) to ensure that the average maturity of outstanding debt should always be around y years. DMOs would be told to do this irrespective of the current market configuration of interest rates.
In practice, however, the debt manager is usually given a micro portfolio mandate to minimise borrowing costs (debt servicing costs) subject to an explicitly articulated, preferred level of risk. The sovereign borrowing strategy therefore becomes (partly)
endogenous to monetary developments. The macroeconomic consequences of the (micro portfolio) actions of the debt manager depend (among others) on the prevailing degree of asset substitutability. 32 In normal market (and government borrowing) conditions, the macroeconomic consequences of limited changes to debt maturities would be quite small.
But the consequences could be significant in difficult market conditions (often associated with fiscal dominance).
In principle, governments have great latitude to effect significant changes in the maturity of their debt. A government that borrows short-term in its own currency does not need to worry about its refinancing risks in the same way as a private borrower does. This is simply because of its power to tax and issue money. 33 Markets treat government debt differently from private sector debt because government debt "is just a promise to deliver more of its own liabilities … *cash being+ simply government liabilities that happen to be non-interest-earning." No private firm can do this. Hence, as Keynes put it, a "counterliquidity preference has more meaning for the private borrower than for the Exchequer."
There are of course major disadvantages to excessive dependence on short-term domestic currency debt. Budget deficits become more sensitive to changes in short-term rates. When household holdings of short-term government debt rise, the sensitivity of 32 Related research focuses in detail on the conditions and assumptions for the micro approach to PDM to be valid. Blommestein and Hubig (2011) show that the removal or weakening of the riskfree asset condition and the high degree of imperfect substitutability weaken the applicability of the micro approach.
household income to short-term rates increases. This will tend to weaken the effectiveness of changes in policy rates as an instrument to stabilise aggregate demand.
But these considerations do not weaken the case for adjusting issuance maturities in response to exceptional cyclical developments. In fact a government with longer-dated debt at the onset of a crisis is better placed to conduct countercyclical maturity shortening than one which enters a recession with short duration debt. In a similar way as budget surpluses in good times increase the room for fiscal manoeuvre in bad times!
9.
Mandates, accountability and the potential for policy conflicts
As noted in section 2, the setting of monetary policy and the management of government debt were increasingly separated from the late 1990s. Governments became more reluctant to give central banks the dual mandate of both setting monetary policy and managing government debt so as to avoid (potential) policy conflicts. Trying to keep debt service costs down (or even limiting the volatility of such costs) can conflict with the monetary policy need to adjust interest rates. In many countries, this realignment of policy frameworks went together with stronger institutionally independent central banks with clear anti-inflation mandates and the creation of operationally autonomous public debt offices.
The underlying philosophy was that predictable policy frameworks (for both monetary policy and PDM) should help to stabilise expectations and minimise risk premia.
Furthermore, financial markets were assumed to be efficient and only requiring a 'light' regulatory touch. It was also reasoned that potential policy conflicts between monetary policy and sovereign debt management could be avoided by following two "separability principles":  Central banks should not operate in the markets for long-dated government debt, but should limit their operations to the bills market.
 Government debt managers should be guided by a micro portfolio approach based on cost-minimisation mandates, while keeping the issuance of short-dated debt to a prudent level.
In normal times, these institutional arrangements and principles conveniently simplified the lives of policymakers in central banks and debt management offices. More importantly, central banks and DMOs were judged as being fairly successful in executing their respective mandates. Moreover, they allowed each institution to be held accountable for distinct mandates. And they provided some insulation from short-term political pressures.
Central bank activism in debt markets
But recent central bank activism in debt markets as a response to the crisis has inevitably undermined these two "separability" principles. A key problem is that QE operations decided by the central bank could easily be contradicted by Treasury And the US Treasury has been lengthening the average maturity of its outstanding debt during recent years. This is (by itself) difficult to square with the rationale of QE, which aims to shorten the maturity of bonds held by the public. It is therefore essential to examine QE in conjunction with debt management policies. To do this, the first table in Tobin's 1963 paper was updated -which summarised the structure of Federal government debt in the hands of the public. This provides an illuminating bird's-eye view of the consolidated balance 34 Swanson (2011) argues that earlier studies suggesting that Operation Twist in the 1960s was ineffective do not properly isolate the impact of Operation Twist from countervailing influences. He shows that the programme was successful by lowering longer-term Treasury yields by about 15 basis points. On 21 September 2011, the US Federal Open Market Committee decided on a new Operation Twist involving the purchase, by the end of June 2012, of $400 billion of US Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less (Federal Reserve press release September 21, 2011). 35 Of interest is that Swanson (2011) also shows that Operation Twist and QE2 are similar in magnitude. Therefore it seems reasonable to expect the effects of QE2 to be similar to Operation Twist, with an effect on longer-term Treasury yields of about 15 bps.
sheet of Treasury and the central bank. This is, of course, a highly stylised characterisation of the monetary impulse of changes in debt maturity … but it is at least a start. This is shown in Table 2 . With the adoption of QE after the crisis, reliance on short-term debt and Federal This planned purchase took place against a background not only of a substantial expansion in Treasury debt issuance, but also of Treasury policy to lengthen the maturity of its issuance.
The need to take account of US Treasury issuance policy is essential to any assessment of QE. The Treasury had set a policy of lengthening maturity well before QE -a normal response to reduce rollover risks when debt is rising rapidly.
In general, a change to the yield curve induced by central bank action may even lead the debt manager to alter its issuance policy to take advantage of what it might view as a temporary interest rate "distortion". Or it may find it can move quickly to attain a maturityextending objective thanks to favourable market conditions created by the central bank.
Either way, it could respond endogenously to the repricing of debt caused by the central bank. This endogeneity is likely to be complex, time-variant and opaque. The announcement in September 2011 of a new Operation Twist was significant in that it involved the purchase by the Federal Reserve of longer maturity debt than under QE2
-and longer than current Treasury issuance. In the absence of Operation Twist, investors would have had to absorb Treasuries with an average maturity of about 7.7 years in the fourth quarter of 2011. With the Fed's purchases, the average maturity of bonds issued to the public falls to about 5.5 years. One offset, however, will be increased Treasury issuance to replace the shorter-term debt held by the Federal Reserve that will no longer be rolled over.
Is a broader (macro) mandate for PDM needed?
How compelling are then the arguments for revising the conventional (micro portfolio) mandate for PDM? At a recent OECD Global Debt Forum meeting 36 it was concluded that the global financial and economic crises have led to some blurring of lines between public debt management (PDM) and monetary policy (MP), with DMOs operating extensively at the short end of the yield curve and CBs also at the long end. It was also noted that during these crises periods, the different mandates appeared sometimes to be in conflict. As noted above, the minutes of the US Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee have hinted at some tensions.
In addition, it was noted by some debt managers that the mandates of both DMOs Against this backdrop, a senior OECD debt manager recently noted that the "neat-and-tidy world of debt management is a thing of the past."
Conclusion
The recent financial crisis has stimulated re-thinking about the monetary policy dimension of public debt management. Four conclusions can be briefly stated: the fallout from the global crisis -have been operating as large players on the demand side (as part of quantitative easing operations). For these reasons, consultation and co-ordination issues assume first order importance.
The jurisdictional sensitivities between different official agencies should not obscure an important but complex issue. The economics of government debt management (or central bank bond purchases) must be better understood. The macroeconomic and financial context is important. The monetary policy/fiscal policy/debt management linkages were of second order importance when fiscal positions were stronger and fiscal policy frameworks credible. But they cannot be ignored when government debt/GDP ratios will be very high for years. The more complex linkages between PDM, FP and MP may entail new conflicts of interest or of mandates: it is therefore crucial that debt managers, central bankers, and also fiscal policymakers seek a better common understanding of the objectives, functions and institutional arrangements for co-operation and co-ordination.
This will not be easy. A major stumbling block to policies is simply the lack of a generally accepted theory of the macroeconomics of government debt management.
Macroeconomists have been debating this subject for decades.
A common element of the literature on possible macroeconomic objectives is the stabilising or destabilising properties of different debt structures in the face of cyclical movements in GNP or other shocks. In 1998, Barro constructed a model showing that issuing inflation-linked bonds would smooth tax rates in the face of GNP cycles. He also argued that persistent inflation shocks would make long-term nominal bonds more volatile than shortterm ones. Hence the government would shift to short-term issues as the volatility of inflation rose. Missale (1999) took a similar perspective. Tax revenues rise with cyclical increases in income (real and inflation). Short-term interest rates are also procyclical. Hence short-term debt ensures tax revenue and interest payments move together.
Other models have shown how governments can engineer changes in the market value of government debt by market operations to influence the long-term rate. It can do this by altering the maturity of its issuance. In theory, there is no limit to the amount of long-term paper a government can issue in its own currency. At the limit, it could overfund the budget deficit -issue long-dated paper on a massive scale and buy short-term assets from the private sector. One study -cited by Faraglia et al (2010) -found that, given the flatness of the yield curve and its limited volatility, a government following such a strategy would have to hold five or six times GDP in privately issued short bonds and issue similar amounts of long bonds. It is hardly surprising this is not what happens as Faraglia et al (2008) have shown. The reasons are liquidity and credit constraints. The potential private buyers of government debt face liquidity constraints which prevent them from buying an infinite amount of government bonds. The government has a credit constraint in that it would not want to hold an unlimited amount of risky private assets. The assumption of market completeness is therefore not satisfied. The constraints of market incompleteness would be eased in an open economy; but complications arising from currency mismatches would arise.
Much more thinking about these macroeconomic dimensions is therefore needed.
We have argued that public debt management cannot in current circumstances be regarded as neutral with respect to monetary policy. Policy mandates may at some point require some cautious adaptation.
